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LANDLORD EXPOSED TO LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
INCURRED BY TRESPASSER
Gould v. DeBeve
330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
Plaintiff, a two and one-half year-old boy, recovered 2,500 dollars in
an action for damages for injuries sustained when he fell from a third
floor window of an apartment in a building owned by defendant.' The
apartment was leased to one Mrs. Dodd with an agreement restricting
permanent occupancy to the Dodd family. Unknown to defendant, Mrs.
Dodd had permitted the boy and his mother, Mrs. DeBeve, to share the
apartment while paying half the rent.2 The trial judge held that the DeBeves
were trespassers by reason of the restricted occupancy clause; therefore,
they were required to prove that the defendant "was guilty of wilful or
wanton misconduct which proximately caused the injuries to the child" in
order to recover.3 Although the United States Court of Appeals assumed
that the boy was a trespasser, it affirmed the verdict and judgment in his
favor with Judge Miller dissenting.4 The two questions relevant to this
decision are whether the court followed established doctrine in holding the
landlord liable for personal injuries occurring as a result of his failure to
repair the leased premises, and if not, what were the policy considerations
affecting this decision.
The court spent little time discussing the issue of when a landlord
has a duty to repair, and more importantly, whether there was a duty to
this particular plaintiff. Historically, a landlord had no duty to take affirma-
tive action to repair premises; therefore, he could not be held liable even
to his tenant for personal injuries resulting from defects which occurred
after the execution of the lease.5 Although this is still the rule today, some
exceptions have been established. For example, the landlord may be re-
quired to repair the premises by statute or ordinance, 6 as in the District
of Columbia.
7
1 The window from which the boy fell was equipped with a screen which was
warped and cracked and which did not fit securely into the grooves of the window
frames. The defendant was notified of the condition of the screen several times but
did not repair it. Although the boy recovered a judgment, the jury held against his
mother for medical expenses in treating his injuries.
2 Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
3 Id. at 829.
4 Id. at 826.
5 See Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A2d 215 (1939).
6 1 American Law of Property § 3.78, at 348-49 (Casner ed. 1952).
7 D.C. Code Ann. § 1-226 (1961) authorizes the commissioners of the District
of Columbia to make such reasonable police regulations as they deem necessary for
the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of the people of the
District. D.C. Code Ann. § 1-228 (1961) gives authorization for such building regula-
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The District of Columbia Housing Code, section 2501, provides that
housing accommodations shall be maintained and kept in good repair in
order to keep the premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.8 Section
2608 of the housing code provides that the owners of residential buildings
shall place screens in windows during the summer months. 9 The decisions
are in conflict with respect to whether or not a statute which provides that
the owner must keep the building in repair imposes a liability in favor
of a tenant or his privies, injured because of the owner's failure properly to
maintain the premises. Some courts, in the absence of express statutory
provision to the contrary, have held that a general legislative statement
requiring the landlord to repair does not create such liability, 10 while a
slight majority of courts allow recovery."1 The District of Columbia court
discussed this doctrine in Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co. 12 The
tions as are deemed advisable by the commissioners. Pursuant to this authority, the
commissioners promulgated the Housing Code of the District of Columbia which
contains the provision applicable to this case.
8 D.C. Housing Code § 2501 (1951) provides:
Every premises accommodating one or more inhabitants shall be maintained
and kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the
occupants. This part of the code contemplates more than basic repairs and
maintenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include repairs and
maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.
(Emphasis added.)
9 D.C. Housing Code § 2608 (1951) provides:
The owner or licensee of such residential building shall provide screens for
all openings to the external air from March 15 through November 15 both
dates inclusive. Such screens shall have a minimum of 16 meshes to the inch
and be so maintained as to prevent effectively the entrance of flies and mos-
quitoes into the building; provided that effective means other than screens
may be substituted therefor when specifically approved by the head of the
Housing Division of the Department of Licenses and Inspection. All hinged
screen doors shall open outwardly and shall be self-dosing. Half screens may
be used for double hung windows if they are so designed that they can
readily serve either half of the window.
(Emphasis added.)
Taken alone this provision could not be a basis of liability because the language
indicates that the purpose is to prevent the entrance of flies and mosquitoes, rather
than for safety. In Gasquoine v. Bernstein, 10 IIL. App. 2d 423, 135 N.E2d 121
(1956), the court denied relief under a similar ordinance because the meaning of an
unambiguous statute could not be "restricted or enlarged." Id. at 427, 135 N.E2d
at 123.
10 Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934); Tair v. Rock Inv.
Co., 139 Ohio St. 629, 41 N.E2d 867 (1942).
11 See Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W2d 719 (1950) ; Saracino v.
Capital Properties Associates, Inc., 50 N.J. Super. 81, 141 A2d 71 (App. Div. 1958).
12 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The plaintiff sought to recover for injuries
sustained when the entire bedroom ceiling fell upon her. Section 2504 was the specific
code provision requiring interior walls and ceilings to be structurally sound. Section
2301 provides: "No owner, licensee, or other tenant shall occupy or permit the occu-
pancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations.'
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court in Whetzel held that sections 2301 and 2501 impose a liability upon
the landlord for personal injuries caused by the breach of his duty to keep
the premises in good repair.13 Assuming, on the authority of Whetzel, that
the ordinance creates a general duty to repair the window screens, the duty
must nevertheless be owed this particular plaintiff to justify recovery.14
The first sentence of section 2501 of the code provides that accom-
modations "shall be maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent
living accommodations for the occupants." 15 Since plaintiff was an occu-
pant of the premises, a fair reading of the ordinance would be that the
defendant owed a duty to him. However, the plaintiff may not be the type
of occupant to which the ordinance was directed. This is a matter of inter-
pretation of the ordinance in the light of the evil which the legislature
attempted to correct.16 It would appear that the commissioners meant to
protect people lawfully on the premises in the right of the tenant, but it
is unlikely that a person on the premises in violation of a lease agreement
was meant to be protected.
Another exception to the rule that a landlord is not liable for personal
injuries incurred as a result of his failure to repair leased premises occurs
where he covenants generally to make repairs. This exception is supported
by a growing minority of jurisdictions' 7 and by the Restatement of Torts.'8
The lease in the present case contained a covenant by the landlord to make
all repairs except those necessitated by damage caused by the tenant.19
However, a majority of authorities hold there is no liability even when
there is such a covenant.20 Various reasons have been given for denying
relief. Some jurisdictions hold that tort liability cannot be based upon the
lessor's breach of an agreement.21 Many cases have denied relief for per-
sonal injuries based upon a contract because the injuries were not con-
'8 Id. at 950.
14 Prosser, Torts § 53, at 331 (3d ed. 1964).
15 D.C. Housing Code § 2501 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
16 See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 14, § 35.
17 Waterbury v. Riss & Co., 169 Kan. 271, 219 P2d 673 (1950). See Spencer v.
Bartfield, 334 Mass. 667, 138 N.E.2d 129 (1956).
Is Restatement, Torts § 357 (1934) states:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to his lessee
and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sub-lessee by
a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee has taken
possession, if
(a) the lessor, as such, has agreed by a covenant in the lease or otherwise
to keep the land in repair, and
(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land
which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented.
(Emphasis added.)
19 Gould v. DeBeve, supra note 2, at 828 n.1.
20 Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Comm., 223 Miss. 630, 78 So. 2d
743 (1955); Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109 N.E2d 556
(Ct. App. 1952) ; 1 American Law of Property § 3.79 (Casner ed. 1952).
21 Jacobson v. Leaventhal, 128 Me. 424, 148 Atl. 281 (1930). See Denny v.
Burbeck, 33 Mass. 310, 130 N.E2d 542 (1955).
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templated at the time the lease was executed.22 A few states deny recovery
because the lessor has relinquished control over the premises.2 3 No District
of Columbia case has been found specifically holding that a landlord is liable
for personal injuries as a result of his breach of a covenant to repair and
the court cites none. However, there have been many opinions which have
assumed that such is the rule.24
Even if in the District of Columbia there is a duty of care on the part
of a landlord who covenants to repair the premises, it does not necessarily
follow that there is a duty to act for the benefit of the type of plaintiff in-
volved in DeBeve. The court assumed the correctness of the characterization
of the plaintiff as a trespasser, but it still held there was a duty not "wilfully
or wantonly" to fail to repair.2 5 This result could have been justified on the
ground that the plaintiff was not a trespasser,26 but the court did not attempt
to do so. 27 The question of liability, therefore, does not seem to turn upon
the distinctions of trespass. Rather it is a question of the fundamental
fairness of holding the defendant liable to a person who was occupying
the premises in violation of the lease agreement. It could be argued that
this plaintiff is really no different from a social guest, and therefore the
landlord's duty extends to him.28 The language of the Restatement of Torts
supports this view, stating that if the lessor covenants to keep the land in
repair, he is liable to his "lessee or others upon the land with the consent
of the lessee. . ".." 29 Is this plaintiff the ordinary guest? If the basis of the
22 Williams v. Fenster, 103 N.J.L. 566, 137 Atl. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; Jordan v.
Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 101 S.E. 550 (1919). See Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 310,
85 N.E.2d 545 (1955).
23 Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Ill. App. 55, 106 N.E2d 210 (1952).
24 Harriston v. Washington Housing Corp., 45 A.2d 287, 288 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
1946) states inter alia: "In the absence of express agreement by the landlord to
repair, or fraudulent misrepresentations as to the condition of premises, or deceit or
concealment by landlord, tenant takes the risk of safe occupancy and takes the prop-
erty as he finds it." (Emphasis added.) Other cases have assumed the same rule:
Daly v. Toomy, 212 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C. 1963) ; Fortner v. Moses, 49 A.2d 660
(D.C. Munic. Ct. 1946); Walker & Dunlop, Inc., v. Gladden, 47 A2d 510 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1946).
25 Gould v. DeBeve, supra note 2, at 829.
26 The action of trespass was designed to protect the interest of exclusive posses-
sion of land; therefore, a landlord cannot sue for a trespass when the land is in the
possession of the tenant. Nor was the plaintiff a trespasser with respect to the tenant,
Mrs. Dodd, since he was present with her permission. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 14,
§ 13.
27 Gould v. Defleve, supra note 2, at 829. "[P]rojecting the label ...cannot
rationally be an automatic determinant of the result in each case in which injuries
attributable to the landlord have been sustained." Ibid.
28 A minority of jurisdictions hold that where the landlord would be liable for
personal injuries sustained by the tenant, he is also liable to members of the tenant's
family, social guests, invitees, and others on the land in his right. Prosser, op. cit.
supra note 14, § 63, at 422.
29 Restatement, Torts § 357 (1934).
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duty to the social guest is contractual,"° and the social guest is not a party
to that contract, then he recovers only because he is a third party bene-
ficiary to the lease agreement. Although the courts and textwriters do not
think of the problem in this manner when they impose liability on the
landlord for the injuries of a person not a party to the lease agreement,
they in effect imply that the person injured was meant to be benefited
by the landlord's promise to repair. This implication seems valid, because
it is normally contemplated at the time of the lease agreement that the
tenant will have guests and invitees on the property. Following this line
of reasoning, there would presumably be no reason why the parties could
not agree that the benefit of the promise did not extend to a certain person.
In order for the plaintiff to recover under the theory of third party bene-
ficiary, he must prove that the promisee (lessee) intended to benefit the
class of persons of which he is a member.31 But here it seems extremely
difficult to infer that Mrs. Dodd meant to benefit the plaintiff's class by
obtaining the defendant's promise when in the same agreement she had
promised to exclude all permanent occupants except herself and her family,
and the plaintiff was a member of the excluded class. Therefore, taking the
instrument as a whole into consideration, it seems very likely that there
was no duty created toward this plaintiff by the lease agreement.3 2
In finding a duty in the instant case, the court did not seem greatly
concerned with the fine points of the legal rules involved. Therefore it
would be profitable to examine the policy issues which may have influ.
enced the court's decision. Although the character of the neighborhood
was not indicated, a significant number of rented dwellings are located
in slum areas. In these areas the tenants are frequently not able to pay
damages for injuries to third persons injured on the leasehold. More-
over, they are not likely to insure against liability; therefore, the ultimate
risk of loss lies with the person injured. By comparison the landlord seems
to be a better risk bearer. If he has more than one tenant, he can spread
the risk of injury to all the tenants through increased rents. Likewise, the
landlord would be more likely to insure against liability resulting from his
failure to repair because he owns property which can be levied upon, and
would frequently have more to lose by an adverse judgment than would
the tenant. The cost of repairs and of insurance would be passed on to the
tenants, who would, as a class, bear the ultimate risk of loss. It has been
30 Although the liability is in tort, the underlying duty arises out of the con-
tractual relation. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 14, § 63, at 422.
31 There are two principal classes of beneficiaries who may enforce the contract,
the creditor beneficiary and the donee beneficiary. The plaintiff is not a creditor bene-
ficiary because the performance of the promise will not satisfy any duty owed to him
by Mrs. Dodd. In order to be a donee beneficiary he must show that Mrs. Dodd
procured the promise from the defendant with the intention of conferring a right
on the beneficiary against the defendant. 2 Williston, Contracts § 356 (3d ed. 1959).
32 A similar result could have been reached if the court had construed the de-
fendant's promise to repair and Mrs. Dodd's promise to restrict permanent occupancy
as mutually dependant promises. When Mrs. Dodd breached her promise, the de-
fendant would no longer have had a duty to repair the premises.
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argued that this added burden would cause rents to increase to such a level
that many members of the working class would not be able to afford the
cost of housing.3 3 In answer to this, it has been said the landlord cannot
charge more than the market will bear; thus some of the burden would rest
upon the landlord.34 This could, however, have the undesirable result of
discouraging private investment and ownership in real estate.
The reason most often given for not imposing a duty on the land-
lord to repair is that he is not in control of the premises and is not in a
position to observe the defects on the leasehold as they occur.3 5 The tenant
is in a better position to discover hazards and protect himself from them.
If the landlord were required to repair, he would need power to inspect
the premises periodically to avoid liability. Presumably rules would have
to be formulated to preserve the tenants' privacy against continuing or un-
necessary intrusions by the owner. The harshness of this policy as applied
to landlords is ameliorated considerably by the widespread requirement that
the lessee give notice of defects of which he has knowledge. The landlord
thus notified must have failed to exercise reasonable care in order to incur
liability.3 6 Such notice was given the defendant in the instant case not once,
but several times: this giving of notice to the landlord about known defects
sweeps away the only serious objection to the raising of a statutory or con-
tractual duty to repair.
33 Eldredge, "Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair," 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 467,
490 (1936).
34 Shulman & James, Torts 617 (2d ed. 1952).
35 See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 27.16 (1956). However, this problem did not
exist in the present case because the defendant was notified of the defect.
36 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 14, § 63, at 423.
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